Rational avoidance of accountability

  • Mark Lauchs

Abstract

Governments across Australia regularly present the public with new accountability mechanisms. They are often developed reluctantly but, when released, presented as proof of the government’s bona fides as an honest and democratic institution. Nonetheless the public does not have a very high level of confidence in their political and executive institutions.1 The reasons for this apparent inconsistency may be numerous but there is one immediate question that can be asked: Why does the public still distrust government even though the amount of accountability regimes is increasing? The simple answers may be that either the public is unaware of the good done by these regimes and/or the regimes do not work. This paper will present a logical argument to show that it is advantageous for governments to produce accountability mechanisms but disadvantageous for these mechanisms to function effectively.

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Published
Dec 1, 2007
How to Cite
LAUCHS, Mark. Rational avoidance of accountability. QUT Law Review, [S.l.], v. 7, n. 2, dec. 2007. ISSN 2201-7275. Available at: <https://lr.law.qut.edu.au/article/view/137>. Date accessed: 21 apr. 2019. doi: https://doi.org/10.5204/qutlr.v7i2.137.
Section
Articles - General Issue
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